It is nevertheless clear that response times can provide highly informative, mechanistic perspectives on cognitive processes (Jensen,
2006; Luce,
1986; Posner,
1978). In the field of perceptual judgment, for example, critical insights have come from studying choices
and their timing, treating both as the product of neural decision mechanisms (Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen,
2005). A single general decision format capable of explaining data from behavior as well as neurophysiology has emerged (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen,
2006; Gold & Shadlen,
2007; Smith & Ratcliff,
2004): a scalar decision variable accrues evidence in support of potential choices over time, and the first to reach a threshold or “bound” is chosen (Carpenter & Williams,
1995; Laming,
1968; Ratcliff,
1978; Usher & McClelland,
2001). Resulting decision models have proven powerful: They can explain response times for judgments about sensory features such as brightness and motion (Ratcliff,
2002; Roitman & Shadlen,
2002); they capture details of the neural activity in various brain regions underlying such decisions (Hanes & Schall,
1996; Shadlen & Newsome,
2001); and they can adjudicate between different hypotheses about experimental influences on behavior (de Gardelle & Summerfield,
2011; Hanks, Ditterich, & Shadlen,
2006; Yang & Shadlen,
2007). As well as simple sensory judgments, similar decision processes are thought to govern responses in value-based decisions (Hare, Schultz, Camerer, O'Doherty, & Rangel,
2011).