Attention and awareness are traditionally believed to be closely linked (Driver & Vuilleumier,
2001; James,
1890; Mack & Rock,
1998; Rees & Lavie,
2001; Zeman,
2001). However, the precise nature of this link is not clear. A number of recent works have questioned this traditional view (for a review, see Koch & Tsuchiya,
2007), with some theories suggesting that attention can only be allocated to consciously accessible stimuli (Block,
1996; Lamme,
2003). However, in the Load Theory of attention (Lavie,
1995,
2005), stimulus competition for the allocation of attentional capacity occurs regardless of whether or not the observer is conscious of the stimulus representations. Load Theory asserts that the level of perceptual load in the processing of task-relevant stimuli determines the extent to which irrelevant stimuli are processed. Tasks involving high perceptual load that engage full attentional capacity in the processing of task-relevant stimuli leave no capacity for the processing of any task-irrelevant stimuli (conscious or unconscious alike), but in tasks of low perceptual load any spare capacity left over from relevant stimulus processing spills over to the processing of irrelevant stimuli regardless of whether or not subjects are conscious of the representations. Indeed, the level of perceptual load determines brain responses evoked by irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Rees, Frith, & Lavie,
1997; Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois, & Chun,
2004; for a review, see Lavie,
2005) even at the earliest stages of visual processing (O'Connor, Fukui, Pinsk, & Kastner,
2002; Schwartz et al.,
2005), including areas whose activity may reflect unconscious perception (Crick & Koch,
1995; Haynes & Rees,
2005). Moreover, a recent fMRI study confirmed that retinotopic activity in primary visual cortex (V1) related to the unconscious processing of invisible tool images is modulated by perceptual load (Bahrami, Lavie, & Rees,
2007).