A large class of brightness illusions has been categorized as “filling-in” phenomena. The Craik–Cornsweet–O'Brien illusion (Cornsweet,
1970; Craik,
1966; O'Brien,
1958) is a particularly striking example in which the perceived lightness of a region of uniform luminance can be profoundly altered by the presence of a luminance gradient along all or part of the border enclosing the region (
Figure 1). In the example shown, central regions of the forehead and beret are of identical luminance but appear very different. It has been widely assumed that such computations of relative brightness are a high-level mechanism carried out at a cortical level (Boyaci, Fang, Murray, & Kersten,
2007; Huang, MacEvoy, & Paradiso,
2002; Pereverzeva & Murray,
2008; Perna, Tosetti, Montanaro, & Morrone,
2005; Roe, Lu, & Hung,
2005; Rossi & Paradiso,
1999; Rossi, Rittenhouse, & Paradiso,
1996), consistent with the observations that high-level interpretation of a scene, such as the perceived curvature, orientation, and depth of a surface can influence the magnitude of the effect (Knill & Kersten,
1991; Purves, Shimpi, & Lotto,
1999).
Although the context in which the light–dark border is presented can enhance the CCOB effect, the illusion can be driven purely by border information in the absence of any coherent high-level information (Burr & Morrone,
1994; Cohen & Grossberg,
1984; Davidson & Whiteside,
1971; Gerrits & Vendrik,
1970; Grossberg & Todorovic,
1988; Maddess, Davey, Srinivasan, & James,
1998; Paradiso & Nakayama,
1991; Rudd & Arrington,
2001;
Figure 2A).
Several low-level models of this phenomenon (Grossberg,
1994; Pessoa, Mingolla, & Neumann,
1995) share a common conceptual similarity, using significant image features to infer a brightness value that is then propagated across space (at a cortical level) to “fill in” regions of homogenous luminance. However, recent psychophysical observations (Dakin & Bex,
2003) challenge this orthodoxy by showing that phase scrambling low—but not high—spatial frequencies (SFs) in the image destroys the CCOB illusion (see
Figures 2B and
2C). This is important since it shows that introducing large amounts of luminance fluctuation into previously uniform areas does not greatly affect the illusion, even though such a manipulation would be catastrophic for models relying on “brightness propagation” between boundaries.
Sensitivity of the CCOB to the spatial frequency structure of the image led Dakin and Bex (
2003) to propose that the mechanism responsible for the CCOB illusion operates by amplification of the weak low SF structure of the image (to bring the image statistics into line with natural scenes, in which low SFs are greatly over-represented), rather than via propagation of a neural signal across space. Specifically, the model works by filtering an incoming image with a bank of SF-tuned filters, and then iteratively reweighting and summing the filter outputs to reconstruct an image with as-close-to-natural statistics as possible. This approach predicts the CCOB and its variants including the missing fundamental illusion
1 (Kingdom & Simmons,
1998), as well other filling-in illusions such as White's effect (White,
1979). Critically, this model works optimally with isotropic (non-orientation-tuned) mechanisms. This led us to hypothesize that neural signatures of brightness filling-in may be seen at very early, possibly subcortical, stages of visual processing.
Although single unit electrophysiology has established a key role for early cortical visual areas (notably V1 and V2) in brightness perception in macaque monkeys (Huang et al.,
2002; Kinoshita & Komatsu,
2001; Roe et al.,
2005) and cats (MacEvoy, Kim, & Paradiso,
1998; Rossi & Paradiso,
1999; Rossi et al.,
1996), there is considerably less work on brightness-correlated responses in the LGN (Rossi & Paradiso,
1999; Valberg, Lee, Tigwell, & Creutzfeldt,
1985). Modulating the luminance of the far-surround on neurons centrally stimulated with either a uniform luminance patch or drifting bars results in significant modulation of the responses of more than half of LGN neurons (Rossi & Paradiso,
1999). Furthermore, changes in steady-state illumination of the surround of LGN neurons can facilitate or suppress responses in a manner consistent with simultaneous brightness contrast (Valberg et al.,
1985). However, such experiments have essentially characterized the influence of surrounding luminance on LGN response to conventional stimuli, using conditions not designed to produce clear illusory shifts in brightness. In this sense such approaches may not be optimal for studying the neural analogues of brightness perception in humans.
In humans, cortical responses correlated with perceived brightness are seen as early as V1 (Boyaci et al.,
2007; Pereverzeva & Murray,
2008), as well as in higher areas of the dorsal visual stream (Boucard, van Es, Maguire, & Cornelissen,
2005; Cornelissen, Wade, Vladusich, Dougherty, & Wandell,
2006; Perna et al.,
2005). However, no investigation of the LGN has been undertaken, despite the evidence from animal electrophysiology reviewed above. Therefore, we set out to investigate whether responses early in the human retino-striate visual pathway correlate with perceived brightness. In four linked experiments we provide converging evidence to suggest that signals correlated with perceived brightness arise from populations of monocular neurons in LGN and primary visual cortex.