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Helene Gauchou, Ronald Rensink; Another look at mindsight. Journal of Vision 2010;10(7):740. doi: https://doi.org/10.1167/10.7.740.
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© ARVO (1962-2015); The Authors (2016-present)
Whenever a change occurs in a visual display, some observers occasionally sense it (i.e., feel that something is happening) for several seconds before they are able to see it (i.e., form a visual picture of the event). Given the difference in phenomenological experience, and various behavioral dissociations between these two forms of experience, Rensink (2004) suggested that sensing and seeing involved different modes of perception; the mode enabling sensing was termed “mindsight”. Alternatively Simons et al. (2005) suggested that both experiences were due to a single mode (i.e., regular sight), with sensing simply a verification stage when perception of change is weak. During the past few years, new studies have brought to light new evidence in favor of the mindsight hypothesis. However, the controversy about the existence of this mode of perception still remains. It is therefore time to collect and confront the various experimental results in order to draw a clear picture of the state of experimental evidence for and against a distinct mode of visual perception. We review the different arguments on both sides of this debate, clearly define the notions at stake, present some new results and several considerations (both conceptual and experimental) to help settle this issue.
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