In contrast to these theories that assume that experience leads to the formation of internal models of specific objects and their likely locations, other theories assume that what is learned is not about objects per se, but rather statistical properties of the environment, which might steer attention to locations containing surprising visual information (Itti & Baldi,
2009; Zhang et al.,
2008) or might optimize attention to situations that are likely to occur in the future (e.g., Mozer & Baldwin,
2008; Mozer, Shettel, & Vecera,
2006). The various statistical theories agree in claiming that attention is modulated by statistics of the environment, but they differ in terms of the time period over which statistics are collected. Some theories rely on life long history (e.g., Kanan et al.,
2009; Torralba,
2003; Zhang et al.,
2008), some theories rely on the recent history of experience and suggest trial-to-trial modulations of attention (e.g., Itti & Baldi,
2009, temporal surprise; Mozer & Baldwin,
2008; Mozer et al.,
2006; Yu, Dayan, & Cohen,
2009), and finally, some theories assume that experience does not extend beyond the statistics of the current image (e.g., Bruce & Tsotsos,
2009; Itti & Baldi,
2009, spatial surprise; Torralba et al.,
2006, bottom-up component). Like all of these theories, TASC can be cast in a probabilistic framework and the saliency values can be readily interpreted as probabilities. TASC has the virtue of spanning a range of time scales of adaptation. Some simulations we presented rely on experience on the time scale of years (e.g., attention in real-world scenes, lower region bias in figure–ground assignment); other simulations rely on experience on the time scale of minutes (e.g., contextual cuing). Adaptation to experience is seen on an even shorter time scale in research focusing on sequential effects in attention (e.g., Geng & Behrmann,
2005; Kristjansson,
2006; Maljkovic & Nakayama,
1994). Just as TASC adapts to the block-by-block statistics in contextual cuing experiments, the neural networks that learn specific object associations exhibit trial-by-trial sequential dependencies due to online learning. Regardless of how TASC plays out compared to other probabilistic theories, we view TASC as the culmination of a shift in the theoretical literature, from the assumption of hardwired, fixed mechanisms of attention to the view that every aspect of attentional control relies on adaptation to the ongoing stream of experience.