The “problem of phenomenal identity,” as defined by the Gestalt psychologist Joseph Ternus, refers to the ability of the human visual system to establish and to maintain the identities of objects despite the fact that the attributes that define these objects can undergo drastic changes (Ternus,
1926,
1938). For example, as different perspective views of a moving object are imaged on the retina over time, the position, shape, size, color, and texture of the moving object can change. Nevertheless, our visual system is capable of preserving the identity of the object (e.g.,
my neighbor's dog) despite these drastic featural changes. This presents a dual problem for the visual system: On the one hand, how are identities of objects established and maintained despite changes in the defining features of the objects (“feature invariance”)? On the other hand, how are specific features in the retinotopic image attributed to the correct objects (“feature specificity”)? High-level object recognition and categorization are relatively invariant to most specific features, such as position, viewing angle, shading, etc. In contrast, phenomenally, perception is feature specific, in that at any time instant, we do not perceive an abstract object devoid of its features but rather we perceive an object
with its specific features. Over the years, several experimental paradigms and theoretical constructs have been developed to address different parts of this general problem. For example, in his seminal work, Ternus used an experimental paradigm, known now as “Ternus” or “Ternus-Pikler displays” to probe conditions that lead to the maintenance or exchange of object identities (Ternus,
1926,
1938). These displays are still widely used to investigate both the problem of feature invariance (rev. Petersik & Rice,
2006) and feature specificity (Boi, Öğmen, Krummenacher, Otto, & Herzog,
2009; Öğmen, Otto, & Herzog,
2006; Öğmen & Herzog,
2010; Otto, Öğmen, & Herzog,
2008). Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs (
1992) used an “object-specific priming” paradigm and proposed that phenomenal identity of objects is created by opening “object files” and are maintained by indexing these object files by their instantaneous location. According to their account, feature specificity is obtained by inserting features into object files.