The notion that a higher level of processing, such as semantic activation, may contribute to the distractor-previewing effect under certain conditions leads us to consider two phenomena that are similar to the distractor-previewing effect. In this section, we will consider whether each of those two phenomena shares a common mechanism with the distractor-previewing effect. First, demonstrating the familiarity effect in a visual search task (Wang, Cavanagh, & Green,
1994), observers were able to search faster and more efficiently for an unfamiliar target among familiar distractors than for a familiar target among unfamiliar distractors. So, in the distractor-previewing condition, the familiarity of current distractors increases temporarily, due to the perceptual adaptation or semantic activation created by viewing the distractors on the preceding trial. In the same way, current-target familiarity increases by viewing it as a stimulus in the target-previewing trial. In short, in the distractor-previewing condition, observers view “familiar” distractors (familiarised in a preceding trial) in search trials, while in the target-previewing condition, they view a “familiar” target. Wang et al. (
1994) argued that this pattern of results is consistent with Treisman’s (
1985) explanation of an asymmetrical familiarity effect, such that familiar items are coded as standards and unfamiliar items are coded as deviations from standards. Because standards elicit less activity, as compared to deviations, as Treisman (
1985) has suggested, the visual search for a deviation from standard distractors is facilitated. Therefore, the reaction time in the distractor-previewing condition (i.e., unfamiliar target among familiar distractors) will be less than that in the target-previewing condition, which is the distractor-previewing effect.
We should, however, be cautious in defining familiarity. Although Wang et al. (
1994) defined familiarity in terms of the observer’s extant knowledge, the stimuli in our experiments (i.e., red and green diamonds) were likely equally familiar to the observers, and so the familiarity explanation holds only if the familiarity of the colored diamonds is assumed to increase or decrease on a trial-by-trial basis. We can distinguish the familiarity effect from the distractor-previewing effect, in that the former is due to a long-term adaptation process, while the latter is due to short-term adaptation. Future experiments should investigate whether the long-term familiarity effect shares a mechanism(s) in common with the short-term distractor-previewing effect.
Negative priming, defined as slow responses to stimuli that have previously been ignored (Tipper,
1985), might also be related to the distractor-previewing effect. Milliken, Joordens, Merikle, and Seiffert (
1998) presented a probe display that consisted of two differently colored (green and red) superimposed words, preceded by a preview that contained one of the words in the probe display (all presented in the center of the screen). The observer’s task was to view the preview displays passively and to name aloud the red word in the probe displays. The preview words were either the target word in the probe displays (the target repeated condition) or the distractor word (the distractor repeated condition). Their results showed faster responses to the target in the distractor repeated condition than in the target repeated condition.
It is premature, though, to regard the distractor-previewing effect reported by Goolsby and his colleagues, and in the present study, as same phenomenon as the distractor repetition effect reported by Milliken et al. It is important to note that Milliken et al. (
1998) showed that selection of a probe among other items was critical to obtain the effect of distractor repetition. When their probe display contained a single target without any distractors, there was no repetition effect. This is consistent with other negative priming studies, which show the effect of distractor-repetition occurs only when selection of a probe was involved (Lowe,
1979; Moore,
1994; Tipper & Cranston,
1985). We have shown that, unlike for the distractor repetition effect, there is no need for selection during the probe display to obtain the distractor-previewing effect (i.e., the distractor-previewing effect occurs even when the probe display contained only one item to be responded to) (Ariga, Lleras, & Kawahara,
2004). Therefore, we can draw a line between the distractor-repetition effect and the distractor-previewing effect.