In light of this idea, it is relevant to discuss a recent publication by our laboratory (Noest, Van Ee, Nijs, & Van Wezel,
2007), which addresses the effects of
ambiguous prior stimuli on initial dominance. An established example of such effects is so-called perceptual stabilization of ambiguous stimuli: The tendency, when an ambiguous stimulus is periodically removed from view, for the same percept to gain dominance on many consecutive reappearances (Leopold et al.,
2002; Orbach, Ehrlich, & Heath,
1963; Pearson & Clifford,
2005). Arguably, this stabilization reflects the repeated action of a facilitatory effect of dominance during one (prior) ambiguous presentation on dominance during the following (test) presentation. Noest et al. (
2007) systematically varied the timing of such an intermittent presentation cycle and found that in certain temporal regimes, this facilitatory effect changes into an opposite, suppressive effect (as had been suggested by previous findings, Kornmeier & Bach,
2005; Orbach, Zucker, & Olson,
1966). That is, in those timing regimes, subjects tend to see the percept opposite to the previous percept on each presentation. Of note, Noest et al. account for these findings using a model that treats both the facilitatory and suppressive effect as distinct manifestations of one continuous neural process. Specifically, in this model, the rivalrous prior stimulus exerts its effect via progressive sensitivity changes, or adaptation, of neurons coding the dominant percept. In temporal regimes where adaptation is still high at the onset of the new stimulus, the model predicts suppression, whereas in temporal regimes with lower adaptation at stimulus onset it produces facilitation. This mechanism is very similar to the one suggested in
Figure 6, where suppression and facilitation are also proposed to depend on the degree of progression of a cumulative process that occurs during the presentation of the prior stimulus. Indeed, in simulations with this model we can reproduce our present data (see
1), when using a nonrivalrous prior stimulus as input instead of the rivalrous input for which the model was designed. This indicates that the effects of unambiguous prior stimuli observed in the present work may reflect similar mechanisms as the effects of ambiguous prior stimuli observed elsewhere. Having said this, it is important to point out several nuances, as not to reduce these ideas to an overly simple “linear rise to threshold” explanation such as used for illustration in
Figure 6b. First, in
Figure 6b facilitation is simply postulated to change into suppression at some arbitrary threshold level of the accumulating signal. In the model by Noest et al., on the other hand, this transition between both behaviors is much less artificial. There, it is a natural consequence of the assumption that adaptation not only has a conventional divisive effect on activity but also has a slight additive effect. Which of the two opposed forces decides dominance at stimulus onset is determined, in part, by the level of adaptation, leading to the observed transition from facilitation to suppression (Noest et al.,
2007). Second, although we believe ambiguous and unambiguous prior stimuli may both engage similar neural mechanisms, there is at least one clear difference. An unambiguous prior stimulus differentially adapts the corresponding neural processing stream from the very lowest level upward (indeed, our data support the view of adaptation on several levels simultaneously; see
Figures 3 and
4b). An ambiguous prior stimulus, on the other hand, contains equal evidence for both percepts and therefore arguably adapts both processing streams equally up to some level where the conflict is resolved. Only from this level onward, there is greater adaptation of the dominant representation. As discussed by Noest et al., differential adaptation prior to the stage of conflict resolution (as occurs using unambiguous prior stimuli) can shift the balance between facilitation and suppression at stimulus onset and has a tendency to shift the balance toward suppression. Differences such as these may contribute to known phenomenological differences between the effects of ambiguous and unambiguous prior stimuli. For instance, contrary to the situation with unambiguous prior stimuli, the facilitating effect of ambiguous prior stimuli does not require the prior stimulus to be of low contrast. Also, the facilitating effect of ambiguous prior stimuli can survive much longer blank intervals than the effects observed in the present work (Leopold et al.,
2002).