Salient visual stimuli can be blocked from conscious perception under a number of conditions such as binocular rivalry (Levelt,
1965; Wheatstone,
1838), attentional blink (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell,
1992), repetition blindness (Kanwisher,
1987), inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock,
1998), change blindness (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark,
1997), or different forms of masking. The latter, and more specifically metacontrast (Stigler,
1910; see reviews by Breitmeyer,
1984; Breitmeyer & Ogmen,
2000), were used to show that “invisible”/nonconscious primes may nonetheless affect the perception of their masker (Klotz & Neuman,
1999; McGinnies,
1949), as well as trigger or modulate motor behavior (Goodale & Milner,
1992; Trevarthen,
1968). Equivalent altered perceptual consciousness states have been described in stroke patients with extinction (Bender,
1952; Critchley,
1949), neglect (Halligan & Marshall,
1993), and blindsight (Weiskrantz,
1990). Epitomes of the current empirical approach to the problem of perceptual awareness, these phenomena have been used as starting blocks for debates on what consciousness might be (e.g., Dennett,
1991; Weiskrantz,
1986), as a means of quantifying awareness-related processes such as attention (see above), signal processing disruption (e.g., Ogmen, Breitmeyer, & Melvin,
2003), or interocular and pattern competition (for a review, see Tong,
2001) and as a substantiation of the dissociation between perception and action (Goodale & Milner,
1992). While the interpretations of the above phenomena have been scrutinized both at their conceptual level and from the standpoint of their neurophysiological substrate, the particularities of the recently discovered
motion-induced blindness (MIB; Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi,
2001) phenomenon defy such analyses.