The movement task under risk just described is analogous to traditional paper-and-pencil tasks (Maloney, Trommershäuser, & Landy,
2007; Trommershäuser, Landy, & Maloney,
2006). In these latter tasks, participants are presented with a set of
lotteries and asked which they would prefer. Each lottery consists of a set of mutually exclusive outcomes, their values (e.g., in monetary gains, or losses), and probability of occurrence. As an example, subjects might be asked to choose between lottery A: “You will receive $4 with probability .8, $0 otherwise,” and lottery B: “You will receive $3 for sure.” Participants often do not choose the lottery corresponding to MEG (Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky,
1988; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,
1982; Kahneman & Tversky,
2000). These failures of the MEG model are often consistent with subjects having an exaggerated aversion to losses (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) and exaggerating small probabilities (Allais,
1953; Attneave,
1953; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Coombs,
1978; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992).