How do we account for the discrepancy between the patterns in localization in space and in spatial relations between simultaneously presented stimuli that we find? How are these different aspects of the same stimuli related in perception? The answers to these questions will depend on hypotheses about how the relevant judgments are performed.
One model of perisaccadic flash localization comes from Awater and Lappe (
2006). They presented a two-stage account of localization seeking to account for convergence effects and their dependence on visual stimulation after the saccade (Awater & Lappe,
2006; Lappe et al.,
2000). In their model, a signal of the “retinal” relationship between a bar flashed before a saccade and the saccade target is compressed, and then postsaccadic stimulation determines the placement of these items in space. Depending on whether or not visual references are present, either these or an extraretinal signal is consulted to determine the location of the saccade target, leading either to compression or to uniform forward mislocalization. They suggest several reasons for a presaccadic distance compression, related to a presaccadic attention focus on the saccade target (Deubel & Schneider,
1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam,
1995; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser,
1995), “reentrant” oculomotor signals (Hamker, Zirnsak, & Lappe,
2004), or a “mismatch between egocentric and exocentric localization mechanisms.” Others (Morrone et al.,
2005,
1997) have also suggested that presaccadic changes in the spatial profile of responsivity of cells in certain brain areas near the time of saccades (Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg,
1992; Kusunoki & Goldberg,
2003) might be involved.
How might our findings be related to this account ascribing separation to distortions in bar-target distance introduced by presaccadic processes? At first glance, they appear not to fit, as in our findings perceptual separation is not much affected by temporal proximity to saccade onset until the eye actually begins to move. Perhaps, however, the temporal interval between flashes is crucial: simultaneously presented bars might not be subject to this effect with respect to each other, but only with respect to the (earlier) saccade target.
It may be, however, that the presaccadic period is the wrong time to focus upon. As Awater and Lappe (
2006) point out, judgments on immediately presaccadic flashes must be performed long enough later that the eye has already moved when they occur. And as they emphasize, this apparently leads to an influence from later events—including visual events—on judgments about this earlier stimulus. One possibility that certainly cannot presently be ruled out is that postsaccadic events are conditions on the very occurrence of “compression” and not only a requirement to make it manifest.
How might convergent localization be understood, if not as the result of a transient compression of the entire visual world? Recent evidence suggests that temporal uncertainty about the relationship between brief, abrupt visual events and saccades as well as “simulated saccades” can be extremely large (on the order of 150–200+ ms standard deviation) (Kumar & Stevenson,
2007). Large increases in spatial uncertainty about location of stimuli when they are flashed near the time of saccades have also been found (Binda et al.,
2007). We might suppose, then, that convergence is a consequence of high levels of uncertainty about the particular forms of information that are used to judge spatial location near saccades.
Brenner, van Beers, Rotman, and Smeets (
2006), in turn, found that spatiotemporal uncertainty about moving stimuli triggered by brief sensory events (flashes or beeps) may lead to reliance on a prior expectation of closeness to the fovea. Such foveal biases have been manifested in flash localization in other contexts as well (Mateeff & Gourevich,
1983; Müsseler, van der Heijden, Mahmud, Deubel, & Ertsey,
1999; O'Regan,
1984; Osaka,
1977; Rauk & Luuk,
1980; Rose & Halpern,
1992). (These biases are likely also reflected in the constant underestimation of spatial spread in our location trials.)
A straightforward hypothesis could tie these facts to convergent localization. If
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the decision process involved in flash-triggered localization includes a delay long enough for decisions on immediately presaccadic stimuli to be taken after the saccade has ended (Awater & Lappe,
2006; Brenner et al.,
2006; Murakami,
2001);
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information on both the relative timing of flash and saccade (Deubel, Irwin, & Schneider,
1999; Kumar & Stevenson,
2007; Volkmann & Moore,
1978) and on flash location (Binda et al.,
2007) is highly uncertain; and
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location is subject to a prior expectation of proximity to the fovea under spatiotemporal uncertainty (Brenner, Mamassian, & Smeets,
2008; Brenner et al.,
2006).
Then highly uncertain flash locations, evaluated when the eye has reached its postsaccadic fixation, would be judged as closer to that fixation point due to the application of the relevant prior expectations. On this alternative hypothesis, convergent localization emerges in psychophysical data as the outcome of a decision process about a particular aspect of the scene—location—and not as a local sample from a globally distorted representation of the scene.
Why should convergence effects depend on postsaccadic visual stimulation? Potential reasons are not hard to find. This stimulation could, for example, enhance uncertainty about earlier positions through automatic, stability-related postsaccadic visual processing triggered by the presence of stimulation carrying local spatial information after the saccade (Deubel,
2004). Richly documented enhancements of visual responses immediately after saccades in many visual areas could also conceivably be involved (Ibbotson, Price, Crowder, Ono, & Mustari,
2007; Lal & Friedlander,
1989; Lee & Malpeli,
1998; Leopold & Logothetis,
1998; Park & Lee,
2000; Rajkai et al.,
2008; Ramcharan, Gnadt, & Sherman,
2001; Reppas, Uppas, & Reid,
2002; Royal, Sáry, Schall, & Casagrande,
2006; Takemura & Kawano,
2006).
Furthermore, it is well established that when flashes trigger judgments when relevant signals are somehow changing, those judgments can be influenced by events in those changing signals over a period on the order of 80–100 ms or more. Well-known examples include the “flash-lag effect” (Eagleman & Sejnowski,
2000; Khurana & Nijhawan,
1995; Krekelberg & Lappe,
2000; MacKay,
1958; Mateeff & Hohnsbein,
1988) and flash localization during smooth pursuit eye movements (Blohm, Missal, & Lefèvre,
2003; Hazelhoff & Wiersma,
1924,
1925; Mateeff & Hohnsbein,
1988; Mitrani, Dimitrov, Yakimoff, & Mateeff,
1979).
What about perceptual separation, on this view? A priori, it seems that the spatial properties of separate items could be subject to anything between total independence (effects on single items apply separately to each) to total unity (effects apply jointly to all bars, preserving spatial information about relations). Results from our presaccadic trials appear to suggest the latter: convergence in location before saccades seems to apply not to each bar independently, but to the pairs of bars flashed together. Insofar as this convergence in location reflects the effects of uncertainty, this would suggest that under our conditions and before saccades, uncertainty applies not to the location of each bar independently but to their placement in space as a pair. Otherwise we would expect the judged locations of the two bars presented simultaneously on either side of the side of the saccade target to be distorted in the same way as the same two bars when presented as part of the two peripheral pairs.
Morrone et al. (
1997) found, in contrast, that pairs of bars flashed near the saccade were separately mislocalized toward the postsaccadic direction of gaze. Conceivably this difference may reflect differences in uncertainty about retinal separation itself. Their conditions of greater eccentricity (Hess & Field,
1993), greater stimulus spacing (Whitaker & Latham,
1997), and lower contrast (Stocker & Simoncelli,
2006) might all be expected to increase visual uncertainty on the strength of evidence from other contexts. The apparent unity of effects on separation and on location in their results thus may be an artifact of their use of stimuli subject to exceptionally high degrees of sensory uncertainty.
Our contrasting results on judgments about different aspects of stimuli flashed near saccades, combined with others in this small research literature, suggest that existing results may not be best explained by the hypothesis of a single, cohesive deformation of the visual world near saccades.