Fifth, are there differences between individuals and mental states in the asynchrony required for segregation? Several considerations suggest that they may be important. First, measures of other forms of temporal sensitivity are commonly used to index arousal or alertness, particularly in psychopharmacological studies. These include critical flicker-fusion frequency (CFF), and dual-pulse resolution (DPR). Second, schizophrenia and schizotypy involve various perceptual deficits. These are particularly clear in tests thought to reflect processing in the magnocellular visual pathways (Butler & Javitt,
2005; Slaghuis,
2004), and, as these pathways signal rapid change, schizophrenia spectrum disorders may also involve impaired use of temporal cues for perceptual organization. Steady-state visual and auditory-evoked potentials are also reduced at higher frequencies in these disorders (e.g., Krishnan et al.,
2005; Light et al.,
2006), which suggests that they involve a reduced ability to track and segregate rapidly changing events. This also fits with the increased backward masking that has been observed in these disorders (e.g., Green, Nuechterlein, Breitmeyer, & Minz,
1999; Slaghuis,
2004). Furthermore, many other aspects of dynamic Gestalt organization are also impaired (Uhlhaas & Silverstein,
2005), and it is possible that reduced temporal sensitivity could contribute to several of these impairments. Finally, various other cognitive processes require the precise temporal synchronization and segregation of neural activities, such as communication between brain regions (Fries,
2005), selective attention (Serences & Yantis,
2006), and working memory (Tallon-Baudry, Kreiter, & Bertrand,
1999). All these processes are impaired in disorganized forms of schizophrenia (Phillips & Silverstein,
2003; Uhlhaas & Singer,
2006), so some have suggested that many of the cognitive deficits in schizophrenia may be due to a core impairment in the precise temporal organization of cortical activities (e.g., Green & Nuechterlein,
1999; Light et al.,
2006; Spencer et al.,
2004), which is in good agreement with the idea of a common cortical algorithm (Phillips & Singer,
1997) and its impairment in schizophrenia (Phillips & Silverstein,
2003).