Another important difference between occlusion and excision is the assignment of border ownership in the missing portion of the shape. Since borders are perceived as being owned by the figure, not the ground (Palmer,
1999; Bertamini,
2006), the interpretation of a shape as being figural or being part of the ground co-varies with the assignment of border ownership (Kim & Feldman,
2009). When occlusion is inferred, the contours of the concavity are assigned to the occluder, not to the occluded object. The fact that these contours do not belong to the occluded object indicates that there really is no concavity in the shape itself. Put differently, there is a reversal in the sign of border ownership at the transition from the true boundary of the occluded object to the concavity (which belongs to the occluder). Indeed, the assignment of the contours to the front layer—and their removal from the representation of the occluded shape—may be a key stage in the amodal completion of the occluded object (Grossberg & Mingolla,
1985a,
1985b). By contrast, when excision is inferred, the boundaries within the concavity strictly ought to belong to the object itself. This means there should be no reversal in the sign of border ownership at the transition into the concavity in the excised shape. Thus, again, the presence of cues indicating that a portion is missing from the shape, but the absence of a reversal of figure-ground assignment may be a key process in perceptual excision. Surprisingly, however, Kim and Feldman (
2009) found evidence that—on a local level—border ownership also tends to reverse in negative parts. They measured border ownership using a small local probe (a perturbation of the contour) and found that when a concavity is seen as a negative part, subjects tend to assign border ownership to the hole rather than to the object. This tendency was clearly related to the saliency (e.g., convexity, see Bertamini & Wagemans,
2012, for a review) or figurehood of the concavity, with small openings and wide interiors exhibiting the strongest effect. Put simply, the more figural a negative part, the higher the probability to interpret it as being due to occlusion (and the less likely it is to have been excised). We however, find that the perception of excision increases with part saliency. Although at first glance, this seems to be inconsistent, we argue in favor of an interpretation of Kim and Feldman's results as being a different parameterization of the same measure. One possibility, e.g., is that border ownership assignment is scale dependent. In other words, subjects assign border ownership in one direction when considering the object as a whole (as measured in our task), whereas local assignment (as measured in Kim and Feldman's task) can be in the opposite direction. Another possibility is that border ownership is not a unitary phenomenon, so that a border can be owned by one side at one level of perception, but to the other side at another level. For example, when a cookie cutter removes a gingerbread man from some dough, at a low level, figural status is assigned to the man-shaped hole, and perceptual judgments about the shape of the hole treat it as if the hole owned the boundary. At the same time, it is clearly the remaining dough—and not the hole—which is made of matter, and at a high level we understand that the hole is a hole and not an object: For example, nobody in their right mind would try to pick up the man-shaped hole, indicating that at another level, the border ownership is correctly assigned to the dough. Interestingly, sculptors also exploit this ambiguity in their experimentations with negative space.