We tested the claim that the tilt illusion's phenomenology might be accounted for by the interplay between two different mechanisms located at different stages of the visual processing stream (Morant & Harris,
1965). To isolate early stages of processing, we used AIB to remove illusion-inducing stimuli from phenomenal awareness. The rationale of using this approach is based on the idea that consciousness emerges only after elaborate perceptual processing unfolding over multiple processing levels (Erdelyi,
1974). If one of these levels is interrupted, the visual information will be unconsciously processed until that stage (Lin & He,
2009). In our specific case, by making the inducing surround unconscious, we wanted to see where the mechanisms mediating the indirect and direct effects are located in the visual hierarchy with respect to the stage where phenomenal awareness emerges.
We found that AIB was successful in eliminating the so-called indirect version of the tilt illusion but not the direct one. Adaptation is likely to decrease low-level neural responses to the surround. Hence, it could be argued that in our experiment, the indirect effect is diminished by a decrease in contrast, rather than by the lack of awareness of the surround. However, this criticism is inconsistent with evidence showing the relative immunity of the indirect effect to contrast manipulations (Wenderoth & Johnstone,
1988).
Blakemore et al. (
1970) explained the direct effect in terms of lateral inhibition between striate neurons with adjacent receptive fields and similar orientation selectivity operating on a local scale. The indirect effect, on the other hand, is believed to reflect mechanisms involved in global orientation analysis occurring, therefore, in extrastriate sites where neurons are tuned to global stimulus properties (Wenderoth & Johnstone,
1987).
The latter conclusion, however, is not completely clear-cut. In fact, there is evidence that some global processes (such as texture segmentation) are implemented as early as V1 (possibly through feedback from extrastriate areas; Lamme, van Dijk, & Spekreijse,
1993). Therefore, it is not impossible for the direct and indirect effects to be at least partly mediated by a common substrate. If this were the case, then the indirect effect could be understood as a consequence of re-entrant activity from extrastriate areas to the striate cortex (Poom,
2000). Our main finding that the indirect effect is abolished by lack of phenomenal awareness is consistent with this idea because it is believed that re-entrant connections from high-level areas to V1 could be crucial for conscious perception (Lamme,
2003). Further support comes from the finding that the direct effect saturates after 100 ms of stimulus presentation. The indirect effect, on the other hand, does not saturate until after 400 ms (Wenderoth & Johnstone,
1988).
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Multiple levels of the visual processing hierarchy might be engaged in determining the repulsive direct effect as well (Clifford & Harris,
2005; Wenderoth & Johnstone,
1987). Previous studies (Forte & Clifford,
2005; Wade,
1980) reported an incomplete interocular transfer of the direct effect. That is, the size of the effect is lessened when the inducer is presented to one eye and the test to the other (dichoptical presentation) compared with when the inducer and test are presented to the same eye (monocular presentation). The amount of interocular transfer is thought to be related to the amount of monocular and binocular neurons engaged in the processing. Therefore, this indicates that monocular neurons, mainly present in V1 (Hubel & Wiesel,
1962), are only partly responsible for the direct effect.
Taken together, these observations are consistent with Morant and Harris' hypothesis of high- and low-level components interacting to generate the angular tuning function that describes the phenomenology of the tilt illusion. Indeed, Morant and Harris' idea can explain the fact that low-level manipulations do not extinguish the direct effect but just reduce it to roughly the same magnitude of its direct counterpart (Wenderoth & Johnstone,
1987). Another prediction implied by a linear combination model is that by suppressing the indirect effect, we should expect a commensurate reduction in the direct effect's magnitude (Wenderoth et al.,
1989).
Our data are at odds with this latter prediction. The fact that repulsive biases are only marginally affected by lack of awareness, however, could suggest that the interaction might be nonlinear instead of additive, as posited by Morant and Harris' original model. For example, the tilt illusion's angular function might result from the implementation of a max rule so that only the maximum output between the two processes contributes to the bias.
An alternative explanation could be related to the proposal of the direct effect resulting from the contribution of multiple levels of the visual hierarchy. A mounting body of psychophysical and neurophysiological evidence suggests that erasing visual stimuli from awareness only weakens but does not eradicate the corresponding neural signal (Blake, Tadin, Sobel, Raissian, & Chong,
2006; Lehky & Blake,
1991; Sobel, Blake, & Raissian,
2004). Furthermore, these weakening effects are first expressed at early levels of processing and become progressively more potent at subsequent stages (Blake & Logothetis,
2002; Freeman, Nguyen, & Alais,
2005; Nguyen, Freeman, & Wenderoth,
2001). If the repulsive effect is really based on low-level mechanisms, we can speculate that it would be subjected to a relatively small amount of suppression. High-level processes, such as those mediating the indirect effect, would instead endure a stronger suppression. Therefore, the smaller weakening observed on the direct effect would be explained in terms of different levels of suppression exerted by removing the visual stimulus from awareness.
It must be noted that our
results are at odds with the conclusions of Mareschal and Clifford (
2012), who reported the persistence of the indirect effect when the surround's orientation was rendered indiscernible through rapid presentation. The major difference in our study is that our surrounds were perceptually invisible to the observers and that phenomenal awareness was assessed on a trial-by-trial basis. However, it is also possible that discrepancies could stem from the techniques employed by the two studies. Indeed, it has been reported that different methods to manipulate visual awareness could yield divergent results when applied to contextual phenomena such as visual crowding (Chakravarthi & Cavanagh,
2009; Wallis & Bex,
2011) and orientation after-effects (Apthorp, Cass, & Alais,
2011). Further investigation could clarify a possible role of different techniques in the discrepancy here observed.