Remembered scene representations can be very detailed and can endure for long periods of time (Hollingworth & Henderson,
2002; Hollingworth,
2004,
2006; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva,
2010). Under the right circumstances we have massive memory for individual objects as well as scenes (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva,
2008; Hollingworth,
2004; Konkle et al.,
2010; Standing,
1973; Tatler & Melcher,
2007). Within scenes, memory performance is predicted by gaze durations (Hollingworth & Henderson,
2002) and number of fixations (Tatler, Gilchrist, & Land,
2005; Tatler & Tatler,
2013) on critical objects. Objects that are task-relevant are remembered better than task irrelevant ones (Castelhano & Henderson,
2005; Maxcey-Richard & Hollingworth,
2013; Williams, Henderson, & Zacks,
2005), but even the irrelevant ones are reliably incidentally encoded (Castelhano & Henderson,
2005; Hollingworth,
2006; Võ, Schneider, & Matthias,
2008). Of course, scene memory is not perfect. For example, boundary extension is a memory error often assessed with explicit drawing tasks. First demonstrated by Intraub and Richardson (
1989), boundary extension produces evidence for “memory” for unseen spaces, inferred beyond the boundaries of the view actually presented. After being shown scenes, people often remember seeing parts of the scene that were never visually presented. Intraub (
2012) suggested that scene-memory is not limited to visual representation, but rather a picture is understood to be part of a continuous world and not simply as a piece of paper with shapes and colors on it.