At first sight, the results seem to indicate that perception and action may be controlled by one and the same neural computation. However, a perfect agreement in absolute thresholds is difficult to reconcile with a naive model of perception and motor control, where initially the visual system analyzes the speed of moving stimuli, and that speed estimate is then supplied to the motor system to control behavior. It has to be kept in mind that neural computations at all levels are prone to noise.
Our results also rule out the possibility that simple measurement noise of the eye movements may give rise to poorer apparent performance of the oculomotor response. This was suggested as a possible cause of the lack of quantitative correspondence in directional discrimination between perceptual and pursuit judgments (
Beutter & Stone, 1998). The results of observer LP clearly place an upper limit on the amount of measurement noise at about 0.11 deg/s. We also performed measurements with a stationary or moving model eye (Fourward Technologies). The output of the stationary model eye had a standard deviation of about 1 mV. With a range of 10 V and a visual field of 20 deg, this corresponds to a standard deviation of slightly less than 10 arc seconds. When the model eye moved at the equivalent speed of 4 deg/s, the standard error of the unfiltered velocity signal over a 500 ms interval was about 0.05 deg/s. This is smaller by a factor of 5 to 10 than any of the other noise sources considered here.
Another source of noise, motor noise from the oculomotor plant, might manifest itself as a reduction in pursuit fidelity compared to the perceptual fidelity (
Beutter & Stone, 1998). In our experiments this does not seem to be the case, suggesting that the magnitude of the noise common to both processes, presumably introduced by the analysis of visual motion, is so large that the separate noise sources are negligible. Alternatively, the amount of noise added separately to the two systems could, incidentally or not, be of similar magnitude.
Absolute comparisons between perception and action, such as above, are potentially prone to attentional modulation. Observers might allocate more neuronal resources to one task or the other, thereby affecting absolute levels of performance (
Kowler, 1990). This may have caused the small differences between perception and action observed in observers BS and SW. A more direct way to investigate the relationship between the circuits driving perception and action is to look at the correlation between the perceptual and pursuit errors made on individual trials. If faster perceived speed goes along with faster eye movements on individual trials, this would support the notion that both subsystems are driven by the same circuitry and signals. A lack of correlation would suggest that independent subsystems are responsible for perception and action. To facilitate such a comparison, we ran a sets of trials where the observers gave a category rating (1 = much slower, 7 = much faster) about the perceived speed of the stimuli, while also tracking the target with pursuit eye movements (see methods).
Initially we describe the results for the long perturbation period. The category rating was correlated with the speed of the eyes on each trial (
Figure 7A). For subject MH the observed correlation is high (ρ = 0.70, p < 0.0001), caused by the fact that the eye speed and the category rating correlate highly with the physical speed of the stimulus (ρ = 0.82 and ρ = 0.87, respectively, p < 0.0001). But when the correlation with physical speed is partialled out, which is equivalent to looking at the error signals, the correlation completely disappears (
Figure 7B, ρ = −0.038, p > 0.1). For the other two observers tested in the rating task (SW and LP), the partial correlation coefficients were also not different from 0 (ρ = −0.002 and ρ = 0.01, respectively). Additionally, we compared the binary faster/slower perceptual ratings with eye speed on a trial-by-trial basis for the experiments described in
Figure 3. There was no correlation between the binary faster/slower ratings and eye speed, once stimulus speed was partialled out. Correlation coefficients were −0.06 and −0.05 for observer BS and MH, respectively, and were not significant (p > 0.1). The large number of trials would have enabled us to expose significant correlations as low as 0.1 (
Cohen, 1988). This means, if there are both common and separate sources of noise, the separate sources would need to have a variance at least 10 times as high as for the common source, and, since the performance for perception and pursuit are very closely matched, and the separate sources would need to be equal in magnitude.
We did the same correlation analysis for the two observers who were tested with the short perturbation interval. In these experiments categorical judgments were made on the same rating scale as described for the long perturbation interval experiments. In agreement with the results above there was no significant correlation for the error signals (DX ρ = 0.04, p > .1; MH ρ = 0.002, p > .4)
This lack of correlation between perceptual and pursuit error held for any time interval during the perturbation period, as is shown in
Figure 8 for two representative observers. The large positive correlation between eye speed and psychophysical judgments gradually evolves during the first 500 ms after perturbation onset (
Figure 8, squares). At the same time, the correlation with physical perturbation speed partialled out, the error (
Figure 8, triangles), remains close to 0 over the whole time period.