In decision making, the role of expected outcome (i.e., reward or punishment) and related variables has been studied intensely (Deco, Rolls, Albantakis, & Romo,
2013; Glimcher & Rustichini,
2004; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz,
2006) and led to increasingly sophisticated theories of motivational learning (Rescorla & Wagner,
1972; Watkins & Dayan,
1992). Similarly, the interest in the (neuro-) physiological foundations of reward processing, which dates back to Pavlov (
1927) and Skinner (
1938), has flourished since dopamine's role as signal for reward prediction error was unveiled (Schultz, Apicella, Scarnati, & Ljungberg,
1992), eventually leading to neuroeconomics (Glimcher & Rustichini,
2004) as a new field within the neurosciences. Especially in nonhuman primates, decision-making experiments frequently employ perceptual tasks, such as discovering coherent motion in random dot patterns (Newsome & Pare,
1988). Despite the use of perceptual tasks, surprisingly little research has addressed direct effects of reward and punishment on perception per se. This is even more remarkable, given that contemporary models of perception under ambiguity and decision-making under uncertainty often use the same “Bayesian” formalism (Bülthoff & Yuille,
1996; Freeman,
1994; Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille,
2004). At least in the context of perceptual rivalry, pupillometric data suggests shared neural mechanisms for decision making under uncertainty and the resolution of perceptual ambiguity (Einhäuser, Stout, Koch, & Carter,
2008). When viewing natural perception as inferring a unique perceptual interpretation from underconstrained sensory information (Von Helmholtz,
1867), it is tempting to think of perception as a decision process among the infinite number of possible interpretations. Under this hypothesis, valuation processes that modulate cognitive decision making should similarly exert a direct influence on the perceptual interpretation of constant stimuli.