Several previous studies have looked at the possibility of cross-modal effects of irrelevant object size during grasping. For example, Castiello, Zucco, Parma, Ansuini, and Tirindelli (
2006) tested the effects of smells of vegetables and fruits odors (e.g., the odor of a strawberry) on grasping kinematics toward plastic replicas of these vegetables and fruits (e.g., grasping an apple). The results showed congruency and incongruency effects of smell (e.g., the smell of small objects such as a strawberry or an almond) on grasping kinematics toward objects (e.g., grasping large objects such as an apple or an orange). In a similar vein, Parma, Ghirardello, Tirindelli, and Castiello (
2011) tested the effects of flavor congruency on grasping, and Castiello, Giordano, Begliomini, Ansuini, and Grassi (
2010) tested the effects of contact sound congruency on grasping (for similar studies, also see Patchay, Castiello, & Haggard,
2003; Tubaldi, Ansuini, Tirindelli, & Castiello,
2008). In most of the experiments in these previous studies, the congruency effects were evident during Maximum Grip Apertures (MGAs), the maximum opening between the fingers that occurs at the second part of the movement trajectory. More importantly, in all of these studies, the irrelevant cross-modal effects were always associated with memory-representations of stored motor actions toward known objects (e.g., a stored motor plan to grasp a strawberry). This makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of previous motor plans toward specific objects (e.g., strawberries or apples) from effects of their symbolic sizes. Therefore, it can be argued that the cross-modal interference effects reported in previous studies have resulted from discrepancies between learned skill motor plans and between online grasping kinematics rather than from the effect of magnitude per se. To that extent, our study uses more general representations of
magnitude (numeric magnitude in
Experiment 1, or nonsymbolic, tone duration magnitude in
Experiment 2), relatively free of specific associations with learned motor programs, making it possible to argue that any cross-modal effects we observe in
Experiments 1 and
2 could be attributed to influences of magnitude per se rather than to incongruency effects with stored motor plans.