We believe the data we have presented here, and similar effects, are best construed in terms of a modulation of an expectation concerning how an object will behave in contact. We are mindful, however, that it is possible to modulate high-level effects, such as one's sense of agency over events, via adaptation protocols (Arnold, Nancarrow, & Yarrow,
2012; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras,
2002; Kawabe, Roseboom, & Nishida,
2013; Stetson, Cui, Montague, & Eagleman,
2006; Yarrow, Sverdrup-Stueland, Roseboom, & Arnold,
2013). For instance, if people are adapted to a delay separating button presses from consequent flashes, when that delay is removed one can have a compelling sensation that the flash caused by pressing a button actually preceded the button press (Stetson et al.,
2006). This type of aftereffect might similarly illustrate how adapting to a basic stimulus property (in this case timing) can have a cascading influence on higher-level inferences (such as agency). Compare this to our finding here, where adaptation to a timing contingency seems to have resulted in changed perceptions of squishiness, which in turn appears to influence causality inferences. We suspect that both aftereffects are caused by a modulation of a perceptual expectation, or decisional criterion, rather than by a neural adaptation that impacts sensory encoding. Some of the authors have previously made similar suggestions regarding an aftereffect that affects audio-visual timing judgments (see Yarrow et al.,
2011).