Consistent with this assumption, previous work found a small but significant correlation between holistic processing and face recognition (
r = 0.2–0.4; DeGutis, Wilmer, Mercado, & Cohan,
2013; McGugin, Richler, Herzmann, Speegle, & Gauthier,
2012;
Richler et al.,
2011a).
1 In these studies, face recognition ability was measured by the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama,
2006), and holistic processing was measured with the composite task (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka,
1998; Young, Hellawell, & Hay,
1987). The CFMT has become a gold standard for quantifying individual differences in face recognition: It has high internal consistency (>0.8; Duchaine & Nakayama,
2006), captures a highly variable ability in the normal population (Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama,
2009), and CFMT scores separate individuals with developmental prosopagnosia from controls (e.g., Bowles et al.,
2009; Duchaine & Nakayama,
2006; Garrido, Nakayama, & Duchaine,
2008), implying construct validity, as this deficit is defined by an inability to recognize faces. In contrast, the composite task was initially designed for use in group studies, and this measure of holistic processing is very robust in that context (see Richler & Gauthier,
2014, for a meta-analysis). It captures important differences between faces and nonface objects in novices (Farah et al.,
1998; Meinhardt, Meinhardt-Injac, & Persike,
2014; Richler, Mack, Palmeri, & Gauthier,
2011), and when measured with objects, it has shown increases associated with the acquisition of perceptual expertise (e.g., Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka,
1998; Wong, Palmeri, & Gauthier,
2009). However, for the purpose of individual differences analyses, it has very low internal consistency (∼0.2; DeGutis et al.,
2013; Ross, Richler, & Gauthier,
2015).