Several authors have suggested that there may be a close association between attentional selection among input elements on the one hand and perceptual selection among interpretations on the other (Brascamp & Blake,
2012; Dieter & Tadin,
2011; Knapen, Brascamp, Adams, & Graf,
2009; Leopold & Logothetis,
1999; Ooi & He,
1999; Paffen & Alais,
2011; Sterzer, Kleinschmidt, & Rees,
2009). Apart from more general suggestions of parallels between bistable perception and attention, there are more specific indications that the history effects that play a role in the two contexts may be related. For example, search priming has been shown to have distinct perceptual consequences, overcoming masking (Ásgeirsson, Kristjánsson, & Bundesen,
2014) and releasing visual stimuli from crowding (Kristjánsson, Heimisson, Róbertsson, & Whitney,
2013). Further evidence indicates that allocation of attention can bias bistable perception (Chong & Blake,
2006; Kristjánsson,
2009; Mitchell, Stoner, & Reynolds,
2004; see also Tanaka & Sagi,
1998), for instance when the cueing of attention to specific elements of the visual input affects the outcome of perceptual conflict during binocular rivalry (Chong & Blake,
2006; Mitchell et al.,
2004). On the other hand, there are also notable differences between history effects for target selection and perceptual selection. In addition to the differences in time dependence that we mentioned above, there are also spatial differences, with the spatial range of sensory memory for bistable stimuli being quite limited (Chen & He,
2004; Knapen et al.,
2009), whereas search priming is not strongly location-specific (e.g., Maljkovic & Nakayama,
1994). Recent evidence shows that perception of unambiguous stimuli can be biased by previously attended stimuli over a broader distance, but it is not clear whether this bias generalizes to bistable perception (Fischer & Whitney,
2014). A further possible difference is that sensory memory for ambiguous stimuli, but not search priming, is strongly dependent on the degree of perceptual ambiguity of the earlier stimulus that leaves the memory (Pearson & Brascamp,
2008). It is an open question how the intricate dependencies of sensory memory on stimulus properties (Pastukhov et al.,
2013; Pastukhov, Lissner, & Braun,
2014) and on intervening events (Kanai, Knapen, van Ee, & Verstraten,
2007; Maier et al.,
2003), compare to such dependencies of search priming (Thomson & Milliken,
2012).