Moving objects are ubiquitous in the world, and so it is perhaps not surprising that much research has focused on how the mind keeps track of object locations, even through visual interruptions such as occlusion (e.g., a cyclist riding behind a car or a person walking behind a crowd). Although a moving object is invisible during this period, it is perceived as having a continuous, persisting identity, rather than as jumping from one location to the next (for a review, see Scholl & Flombaum,
2010). Two paradigms that are commonly used to study how the mind tracks occluded objects are production tasks using a time-to-contact manipulation, in which observers have to press a button when they think an occluded object reaches the other end of the occluder (e.g., Rosenbaum,
1975), and discrimination tasks, in which the object disappears and then reappears further along its trajectory at either the correct or incorrect time, and observers have to discriminate between these possibilities in a two-alternative forced-choice task (DeLucia & Liddell,
1998). Such studies find that observers are fairly accurate at judging when an object will reach a certain location (Battaglini, Campana, & Casco,
2013; Benguigui & Bennett,
2010; Benguigui, Broderick, & Ripoll,
2004; DeLucia & Liddell,
1998; Makin & Poliakoff,
2011; Peterken, Brown, & Bowman,
1991; Rosenbaum,
1975). This is because even during occlusion the mind continues to track the object as if it were still there (the tracking hypothesis; DeLucia & Liddell,
1998), using the smooth pursuit oculomotor system to continuously allocate visuospatial attention to the invisible object's location (DeLucia, Tresilian, & Meyer,
2000; de'Sperati & Deubel,
2006; de'Sperati & Santandrea,
2005; Gilden, Blake, & Hurst,
1995; Lyon & Waag,
1995; Makin & Poliakoff,
2011). Observers do not, however, appear to employ the equally viable strategy of discretely estimating when an object will reach a certain location based on the visual information that came before occlusion (Hecht & Savelsburgh,
2004; Lee,
1976; Tresilian,
1995, although see Benguigui & Bennett,
2010).