Visually guided behaviors, such as picking up a cup of coffee from the table or shifting our gaze toward an approaching car, require many computational steps, ranging from the sensory acquisition of the target to the generation of the appropriate motor command. It seems natural that the planning of motor actions toward visible objects would use the same visual information that allows us to perceive those objects. However, many experimental findings have challenged this idea, suggesting instead that visual information undergoes largely independent processing when used for action as opposed to perception (Bridgeman, Kirch, & Sperling,
1981; Burr, Morrone, & Ross,
2001; Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey,
1991). For example, in healthy subjects, the evidence for different processing mechanisms is based on a reduction of the influence of visual illusion when tested with actions rather than perception (e.g., Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale,
1995). These findings are typically interpreted according to the influential two visual system theory (Goodale & Milner,
1992; Milner & Goodale,
2008), which maintains that the ventral and dorsal visual pathways in the cerebral cortex can be distinguished in terms of the function they serve: The ventral stream would mediate the perceptual identification of objects and the dorsal stream the sensorimotor transformation required to generate motor actions toward those objects. However, the interpretation of these findings is controversial (Bruno,
2001; Dassonville, Bridgeman, Kaur Bala, Thiem, & Sampanes,
2004; Franz,
2001; Kopiske, Bruno, Hesse, Schenk, & Franz,
2016,
in press; Schenk & McIntosh,
2010; Whitwell & Goodale,
in press). For example, Cardoso-Leite and Gorea (
2010) argue that the existing evidence is still consistent with a unique visual processing mechanism that supports both perception and action.