Abstract
On a typical day, we perform numerous integration processes; we repeatedly integrate objects with the scenes in which they appear, and decipher the relations between objects, resting both on their tendency to co-occur and on their semantic associations. Such integration seems effortless, almost automatic, yet computationally speaking it is highly complicated and challenging. This apparent contradiction evokes the question of consciousness' role in the process: is it automatic enough to obviate the need for conscious processing, or does its complexity necessitate the involvement of conscious experience? In this talk, I will present EEG, fMRI and behavioral experiments that tap into consciousness' role in processing object-scene integration and object-object integration. The former revisits subjects' ability to integrate the relations (congruency/incongruency) between an object and the scene in which it appears. The latter examines the processing of the relations between two objects, in an attempt to differentiate between associative relations (i.e., relations that rest on repeated co-occurrences of the two objects) vs. abstract ones (i.e., relations that are more conceptual, between two objects that do not tend to co-appear but are nevertheless related). I will claim that in both types of integration, consciousness may function as an enabling factor rather than an immediate necessary condition.
Meeting abstract presented at VSS 2017