Several studies have argued that stimuli that are of relevance to an observer gain prioritized access to awareness—for example, faces with direct gaze are prioritized over faces with averted gaze (Chen & Yeh,
2012; Stein, Senju, Peelen, & Sterzer,
2011). In addition, fearful faces break through suppression faster than neutral (Gray et al.,
2013; Stein & Sterzer,
2014; E. Yang, Zald, & Blake,
2007) or happy faces (Gray et al.,
2013; Tsuchiya, Moradi, Felsen, Yamazaki, & Adolphs,
2009; E. Yang et al.,
2007), and happy (E. Yang et al.,
2007) and angry (Gray et al.,
2013) faces break through more slowly than neutral faces. This difference in detection times between faces of different emotional valences arguably relies on cortical visual processing rather than subcortical emotional processing, as it has been shown to rely on high-spatial-frequency information (Stein, Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer,
2014) and to be fully accounted for by visual characteristics such as face-to-mouth curvature (Stein & Sterzer,
2012). These findings challenge the notion that the emotional valence of the faces (and thereby their behavioral relevance) determines the degree to which the stimuli are prioritized for access to awareness. Recently, however, it has become apparent that stimuli that have no intrinsic relevance to the observer can, under certain circumstances, be prioritized for access to awareness. For example, a target (e.g., a colored disc) suppressed by CFS breaks suppression faster when it is relevant for a concurrent (memory) task (Gayet, Paffen, & Van der Stigchel,
2013; Gayet, van Maanen, Heilbron, Paffen, & Van der Stigchel,
2016b; Pan, Lin, Zhao, & Soto,
2014; van Moorselaar et al.,
2017). This result indicates that a suppressed target that happens to share a relevant stimulus dimension with a stimulus that is held in working memory is released from suppression faster, and hence that it receives prioritized access to awareness. Furthermore, we have recently shown that a stimulus signaling threat breaks suppression faster than a stimulus that does not (Gayet, Paffen, Belopolsky, Theeuwes, & Van der Stigchel,
2016a). In the latter study, the target that was prioritized for access to awareness again had no intrinsic relevance; it was merely a color that had been previously coupled (via a fear-conditioning paradigm) with receiving electric shocks. However, what remains unclear from this study is whether stimulus relevance can have an enduring effect on access to awareness. That is, does a stimulus dimension that was relevant to an observer for an extended period of time still receive prioritized access to awareness when it is no longer relevant?