SoA has been suggested to be a basic mechanism allowing segregation of the self from the environment and conspecifics (Jeannerod,
2003; Salomon,
2017; Salomon, Lim, Kannape, Llobera, & Blanke,
2013; Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu,
2005). While volitional changes of self–other boundaries may have positive emotional effects (see, e.g., Colzato et al.,
2012), unsolicited and temporally extended loss of SoA over one's actions may cause an unwilled reduction in self–other segregation, resulting in psychosis-like symptoms (Blanke et al.,
2014; Salomon,
2017). For example, if actions are not properly attributed to the self, this could generate a sensation of external control as found in passivity symptoms. Indeed, psychiatric conditions such as psychosis, in which there is a deficit in the delineation of the self (Sass & Parnas,
2003), typically include deficits of SoA (Lindner, Thier, Kircher, Haarmeier, & Leube,
2005; Maeda et al.,
2012; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner,
2010). Several studies have shown a positive correlation between disruptions of SoA and such positive symptoms in individuals with schizophrenia or high schizotypy (Asai & Tanno,
2007; Ford et al.,
2001; Lindner et al.,
2005).