September 2021
Volume 21, Issue 9
Open Access
Vision Sciences Society Annual Meeting Abstract  |   September 2021
Is Contextual Cueing Unconscious? The Indirect Task Advantage in Implicit Learning
Author Affiliations & Notes
  • Sascha Meyen
    Experimental Cognitive Science, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
  • Ulrike von Luxburg
    Theory of Machine Learning, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
    Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, Tübingen, Germany
  • Volker H. Franz
    Experimental Cognitive Science, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
  • Footnotes
    Acknowledgements  Supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) through CRC 1233 “Robust Vision”, 276693517; the Institutional Strategy of the University of Tübingen (DFG, ZUK 63); the Cluster of Excellence “Machine Learning: New Perspectives for Science”, EXC 2064/1, 390727645.
Journal of Vision September 2021, Vol.21, 1831. doi:
  • Views
  • Share
  • Tools
    • Alerts
      This feature is available to authenticated users only.
      Sign In or Create an Account ×
    • Get Citation

      Sascha Meyen, Ulrike von Luxburg, Volker H. Franz; Is Contextual Cueing Unconscious? The Indirect Task Advantage in Implicit Learning. Journal of Vision 2021;21(9):1831.

      Download citation file:

      © ARVO (1962-2015); The Authors (2016-present)

  • Supplements

We have recently shown that typical results from the unconscious priming paradigm suffer from serious methodological flaws that call into question the conclusions of many unconscious priming studies. Here, we describe a similar problem in the contextual cueing literature. In the priming paradigm, participants perform close to chance when directly attempting to identify or discriminate prime stimuli (direct task). Nevertheless, the same stimuli indirectly affect responses (e.g., priming effects on reaction times). From this pattern of results, researchers typically infer better sensitivity for the stimuli in the indirect than direct task, which is further interpreted as processing outside of conscious awareness. However, we have shown that this inference is flawed (Meyen et al., 2020). Similar to the priming paradigm, the contextual cueing paradigm follows the same logic: Participants show close to chance sensitivity in a direct task. In an indirect task, clear cueing effects on reaction times are found. This pattern of results is again used to infer better sensitivity in the indirect than direct task, which is then the basis for further-reaching inferences about unconscious processing. We generalized our methods to the typical contextual cueing paradigm (which often utilizes more response alternatives than the priming paradigm) and estimated the sensitivities of responses in the direct and indirect tasks based on the typically reported results. To do so, we present a model that relates participants’ sensitivity in the direct task to the size of cueing effects in the indirect task. This allows us to compare sensitivities between the two tasks and test for a difference, which is required to make further inferences on unconscious processing. We reanalyzed multiple studies showing that some fail to provide evidence for better sensitivity in the indirect task, thereby calling into question the corresponding inferences about conscious/unconscious processing.


This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

Sign in or purchase a subscription to access this content. ×

You must be signed into an individual account to use this feature.