In contrast,
Dignath, Herbort, Pieczykolan, Huestegge, and Kiesel (2019) recently used a discrimination task to test whether the learned anticipation of spatial congruence or incongruence of a visual and a motor target modulates the link between visual attention and motor preparation. Specifically, they asked participants to accomplish training in which a DT was presented either at the target of a pointing movement or at a position opposite to this target. Results showed that attention is strictly tied to the movement goal location when participants had learned that a DT position always coincides with the MT. In contrast, learning to expect the DT at the position opposite the MT caused participants to shift attentional resources only towards that location, suggesting that it is possible to overcome the attention-action link through practice. However, there are reasons to be cautious in taking these results as evidence against an obligatory coupling between covert attention shifts and processes of motor preparation. First, the pointing task of
Dignath et al. (2019) contained a movement delay (i.e., stimulus onset asynchrony [SOA] between a movement cue and a go-signal for movement initiation) that was relatively long (i.e., 612–799 ms). Thus it is possible that those participants, who had learned to decouple the locus of attention from the movement goal location, did so only after the movement had been fully programmed. This would be in line with the findings of
Deubel and Schneider (2003), who showed that attention can be withdrawn from a reach target but only if the movement is delayed by more than 300 ms, indicating that these movements can be “performed ‘off-line,’ that is, without attention” (p. 295). Second, the discrimination task of
Dignath et al. (2019) consisted of only two placeholder positions at which the DT could appear (i.e., at or opposite the MT). However, the use of only two placeholders makes the discrimination task relatively simple, which could lead to insufficient sensitivity of the attention test (i.e., attention is no longer necessary for DT identification). In such a case, certain outcomes of the discrimination task do not permit unambiguous conclusions to be drawn, particularly when no task-irrelevant control position is available as a baseline condition. For instance, if discrimination performance is observed to be equally well at both positions, it is not possible to tell whether attention was directed towards both positions or whether the task allowed probe identification without attention.
Dignath et al. (2019) reported exactly such a pattern of equivalent performance at both available positions for one control group in which participants had not learned to anticipate the DT at a specific position. It is in this case possible that the sensitivity of the discrimination task of
Dignath et al. (2019) was actually too low to still serve as a reliable measure of attention allocation. This means that it cannot be determined whether the training effects reported by
Dignath et al. (2019) were driven by processes of attentional selection or whether they were rather a consequence of a low difficulty of the discrimination task. In summary, it is still unclear (1) whether the anticipation of spatial incongruence of a visual target and a movement goal location can modulate the attention-action coupling and, if so, (2) whether these top-down effects on attention allocation can occur even when the critical movement programming phase is still in progress.